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Abstract-- The increased interconnectivity and complexity of 
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems in 
power system networks has exposed the systems to a multitude of 
potential vulnerabilities. In this paper we present a novel 
approach for a next generation SCADA-specific Intrusion 
Detection System (IDS). The proposed system analyses multiple 
attributes in order to provide a comprehensive solution able to 
mitigate varied cyber attack threats. The multi-attribute IDS 
comprises a heterogeneous whitelist and behaviour-based concept 
in order to make SCADA cyber systems more secure. This paper 
also proposes a multilayer cyber-security framework based on 
IDS for protecting SCADA cyber-security in Smart Grids 
without compromising the availability of normal data. In 
addition, this paper presents a SCADA-specific cyber-security 
test-bed to investigate simulated attacks and which has been used 
in the paper to validate the proposed approach. 
 
 
Index Terms-- Smart Grid, SCADA, Cyber-security, Intrusion 
Detection 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) 
systems have long played a significant role in power system 
operation, becoming increasingly complex and interconnected 
as state-of-the-art information and communication 
technologies (ICT) are adopted. The increased complexity and 
interconnection of SCADA systems have exposed them to a 
wide range of cyber-security vulnerabilities. Furthermore, 
SCADA systems with legacy devices lack inbuilt cyber-
security consideration, which has resulted in serious cyber-
security vulnerable points. In practice, unauthorised or 
malicious access from outside sources, using IP-driven 
proprietary or local area networks can threaten SCADA 
systems by exploiting communication weaknesses to launch 
simple or elaborate attacks which may lead to denial of 
service, deliberate maloperation or catastrophic failure, and 
consequently compromise the safety and stability of power 
system operations. Thus the requirement to strengthen cyber-
security in SCADA as part of smarter grids, in particular, is a 
pertinent priority to ensure reliable operation and govern 
system stability in terms of communications integrity.  
In recent years, malicious cyber-security incidents have 
occurred in SCADA systems. For instance, in July 2010, the 
Stuxnet worm attacked the Siemens SIMATIC WinCC 
SCADA system and physical Programmable Logic Controllers 
                                                           
 
 
(PLCs), exploiting a number of vulnerabilities including at 
least four in the Microsoft Windows operating system. It is the 
most famous malware attack to have damaged an industrial 
infrastructure directly. According to Symantec's statistics, 
approximately 45,000 systems around the world have been 
infected by the worm including Iranian nuclear facilities [1]. 
Many utilities remain concerned at the possibility of 
“collateral damage” to their infrastructures from Stuxnet-like 
attacks in the future. 
In the early history of SCADA systems it was widely 
believed that such systems were secure in cyber space since 
they were air-gapped - that is, physically isolated from public 
networks. In other words, only physical security was a concern 
rather than cyber-security. Stuxnet crossed both the cyber and 
physical world by manipulating the control system of the 
critical infrastructure, demonstrating that “security by 
obscurity” is no longer a valid approach.  
With the application of IT technologies, new cyber 
vulnerabilities will emerge in Smart Grids and similar critical 
infrastructures. These vulnerabilities could be exploited, not 
only from outside sources, such as terrorists, hackers, 
competitors or industrial espionage, but also from inside 
threats, such as ex-employees, disgruntled employees, third 
part vendors, or site engineers. As well as deliberate attacks, 
cyber vulnerabilities in SCADA systems may also be affected 
by inadvertent events (e.g., user errors, negligence equipment 
failures, and natural disasters). Security for protecting the 
entire Smart Grid technological environment requires the 
consideration of many subsystems that make up the Smart 
Grid, for example Wide Area Monitoring Protection and 
Control (WAMPAC), Distribution Management System 
(DMS), Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI), and higher 
level communication architectures at the grid system level. 
The scope of this paper is to focus on one important subsystem 
level of the Smart Grid environment, specifically cyber-
security for digital substations. This paper proposes a 
multilayer SCADA cyber-security attack detection system that 
improves Intrusion Detection System (IDS) technology. A 
realistic SCADA-specific cyber-security test-bed was also 
developed to investigate cyber attacks and to test the proposed 
IDS methods. This environment provides a platform for the in-
depth analysis of real attack scenarios in a replicated 
substation Local Area Network (LAN), in order to facilitate 
the development of effective attack countermeasure tools and 
technologies for the SCADA cyber domain. 
Section II presents the related work. Section III proposes a 
conceptual multilayer cyber-security framework for SCADA 
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 2 
systems. Section IV proposes a SCADA-specific IDS 
combining whitelist and behaviour-based methods. Section V 
discusses the implementation approach of the SCADA-IDS. In 
Section VI, a SCADA-specific cyber-security test-bed that 
investigates cyber attacks is presented to exemplify and 
validate the proposed SCADA-IDS. Section VII and Section 
VIII are discussion and conclusion, respectively. 
II.  RELATED WORK 
SCADA systems in the Smart Grid will inevitably contain 
legacy systems that cannot be updated, patched, or protected 
by conventional IT security techniques. With limited 
computing resources in legacy devices and the lack of inbuilt 
security for SCADA systems, it is difficult to embed 
traditional cyber security techniques into these legacy systems. 
In these situations, new intrusion detection systems are needed 
to monitor the operation of such systems and to detect threats 
against the systems resulting from misuse by legitimate users 
or intentional attacks by external hackers.  
Intrusion detection technologies in the IT domain are 
relatively mature and numerous intrusion detection methods 
have been presented [2]. Zhang et al. [3] present a distributed 
IDS for wireless mesh networks in Smart Grids, however this 
work does not directly relate to SCADA environments. Much 
research has been proposed and applied in intrusion and 
anomaly detection approaches targeted for SCADA systems, 
such as statistics based intrusion detection methods and 
SCADA-specific intrusion detection approaches [4-12]. 
However, research in SCADA specific detection tools is still 
at an early stage. 
IDSs have been introduced to SCADA systems using 
statistical approaches to classify network traffic as normal or 
abnormal. To build the statistical models, various modelling 
methods can be used, such as neural networks, regression 
models, and Bayesian networks [9]. However, most statistical 
intrusion methods generate false positives which result in false 
alerts, and false negatives which miss real attacks.  
SCADA-specific IDSs have been developed for SCADA 
systems using critical state, model and rule based methods. 
The primary limitation of current SCADA-specific IDSs is 
limited understanding of the range of SCADA applications 
and protocols, as highlighted by Idaho National Laboratory [4]. 
Carcano et al. [6] propose a critical state-based IDS for 
SCADA based on the Modbus protocol in a power plant. 
However, this system can only detect a limited class of attacks 
against PLC systems. Model-based detection is not new in 
traditional IDS work, e.g., specification-based intrusion 
detection can be seen as model based. Cheung et al. [7] 
believe that model-based monitoring to detect unknown 
attacks is more feasible in SCADA systems than in general IT 
networks: three model-based techniques to monitor Modbus 
Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) networks, using 
protocol-level modes, communication-pattern-based detection 
and learning-based approach. Unfortunately, no quantitative 
results were obtained from this work nor detailed analysis 
regarding experimental validation. A rule-based IDS for an 
Intelligent Electronic Device (IED) based on IEC 61850 is 
realised by Snort in [8]. The Snort rules are obtained from 
experimental data based upon simulated cyber attacks, such as 
a Denial of Service (DoS) attack, password cracking, and 
Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) spoofing. The proposed 
blacklist approach is shown to detect known attacks 
effectively. However, blacklists are typically not effective 
against unknown threats or undiscovered vulnerabilities, also 
called zero-day attacks.   
III.  MULTILAYER SCADA CYBER-SECURITY FRAMEWORK  
Current security countermeasures in SCADA systems 
mainly focus on protecting systems from external intrusions or 
malicious attacks. For example, incoming traffic to substations, 
control centres, and corporate networks will be inspected by 
commercial firewalls or IDSs. However, this security 
approach only considers perimeter defences and ignores 
interior detection within a substation network or a control 
centre. For instance, an engineer can enter a substation and 
connect his laptop to the LAN. An intentional or unintended 
attack via an infected laptop now has an improved chance of 
success because perimeter defences have been bypassed. In 
practice and in worst-case scenarios, all the cyber assets in 
SCADA systems should be regarded asvulnerable. However, 
we cannot demand that all the cyber assets meet the highest 
security requirements due to financial cost, time and system 
constraints. Therefore, in order to address this problem, a 
SCADA cyber-security framework based on SCADA-IDS is 
proposed, as illustrated in Fig. 1 that includes the following 
three aspects: 
 
 
Fig. 1.  Multilayer SCADA cyber-security framework with IDS 
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 3 
A.  Security Enclaves 
A security enclave [13] is a secure group of cyber systems 
connected by one or more internal or external networks using 
suitable security policies and techniques in order to minimise 
the attack surface and its impact. It may be defined by logic 
functions or by physical distance. Compared with the 
traditional SCADA structure, the proposed secure architecture 
divides the normal corporate network into a new corporate 
network including enterprise servers (e.g., proxy, web and 
Email server) and corporate Demilitarized Zones (DMZ) 
involving desktops, laptops, Engineering Workstations (EWS), 
business servers, etc. In addition, the proposed secure 
architecture defines two enclaves in the control centre, i.e., the 
control centre DMZ containing the Inter-control Centre 
Communication Protocol (ICCP) sever, Virtual Private 
Network (VPN) server, database, etc and the control centre 
enclave including the Front End Processor (FEP), Human 
Machine Interface (HMI), SCADA/Energy Management 
System (EMS), etc, and two enclaves in the substation, as 
shown in Fig. 1. Here, DMZ means that a network segment as 
a “security buffer area” between the internal network and the 
external network. In the substation, the Data Concentrator (DC) 
or Protocol Gateway (PG) is used to collect and translate data 
from different IEDs or Remote Terminal Units (RTUs) with 
individual protocols. 
B.  Perimeter Defence and Interior Detection 
The proposed enclave-based SCADA cyber-security 
framework focuses on perimeter defences against attacks from 
outside the enclaves and internal detection for malicious 
behaviours or misuse of employees from inside enclaves using 
the proposed multilayer SCADA-IDS scheme. In order to 
deploy appropriate perimeter defences in suitable locations, it 
is necessary to identify the boundaries of security enclaves. In 
Fig. 1 the SCADA-IDSs are deployed in the enclave 
boundaries for the perimeter defence, as well as inside the 
enclave for interior detection. A SCADA IDS can analyse 
traffic not only across enclave perimeters, but also within a 
security enclave, e.g., between an HMI and a PG in a 
substation. 
C.  SCADA-IDS Management System 
The proposed SCADA-IDS management system contains 
Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) tools in 
the Security Operations Centre (SOC), IDS security managers 
at enterprise level and SCADA level, and distributed IDSs, as 
shown in Fig. 2. The SOC may include the correlation and 
intelligence capabilities to manage large-scale cyber incidents 
[21]. An SIEM (e.g., QRadar SIEM [20]) platform supports 
log management, real-time monitoring and security event 
management from a broad range of systems. It establishes an 
early warning system to detect threats based on log events and 
flow information from both the enterprise level and the 
SCADA level. The IDS security manager is designed to 
administer, monitor and configure an individual IDS by secure 
TCP/IP connections. It is possible that the Intrusion Detection 
Exchange Protocol (IDXP) is adopted to exchange information 
among different IDSs. Under real circumstances, a SCADA-
IDS can be set to a local mode which provides local security 
detection and log management; in addition, it transmits some 
data to a security manager for more comprehensive situational 
awareness across multiple security enclaves. Both commercial 
IDSs and the customized IDS can be adopted in the proposed 
SCADA cyber-security framework. 
In this paper, a multi-attribute intrusion detection approach 
is proposed which is tailored for cyber-security at SCADA 
level, as described in the next section. The IDS system at 
enterprise level can be realised by commercial solutions, 
which is beyond the scope of this paper. 
 
 
 
Fig. 2.  SCADA-IDS security management system 
IV.  PROPOSED MULTI-ATTRIBUTE IDS FOR SCADA 
In comparison with traditional IT networks, SCADA 
systems have distinguishing features such as the use of a 
limited number of packets (low throughput), a fixed number of 
communication devices, a limited number of communication 
protocols, and regular communication and behaviour patterns. 
Therefore a SCADA-specific IDS is proposed as an effective 
tool to identify both external malicious attacks and internal 
unintended misuse. The proposed hybrid intrusion detection 
method consists of three attributes: i) Access control whitelists; 
ii) Protocol-based whitelists; iii) Behaviour-based rules. The 
basic detection procedure is illustrated in Fig. 3.  
 
 
Fig. 3.  Progress for Hybrid SCADA-IDS 
SIEM
... ... IDS
SOC
TCP/IP
TCP/IP
SCADA 
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... ...
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 4 
A.  Access Control Whitelists (ACW) 
The access control whitelist approach contains detectors in 
three layers, i.e., source and destination Medium Access 
Control (MAC) addresses (MACsrc and MACdst) in the Ethernet 
layer, source and destination Internet Protocol (IP) addresses 
(IPsrc and IPdst) in the network layer, and source and 
destination ports (Portsrc and Portdst) in the transport layer. If 
any of the addresses or ports is not in the corresponding 
whitelist, the detector will take a predefined action, e.g., alert 
in IDS mode and log the detection results. That is, 
 { } ( , )wlAC AC Actions alert log∉ →  (1) 
where AC = MACsrc, MACdst, IPsrc, IPdst, Portsrc, Portdst  and 
ACwl represents corresponding whitelist set.  
In addition, each host or device in a SCADA system has a 
unique <IP, MAC> match. If the device has not been replaced 
with new hardware and the same IP address of the device is 
detected from two or more MAC addresses, it means that a 
spoofing attack may be happening. 
B.  Protocol-Based Whitelists (PBW) 
The aforementioned access control whitelist refers to layer 
2, 3 and 4 in terms of the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) 
model. The protocol-based whitelist method is related to the  
application layer (up to layer 7) and deals with various 
SCADA protocols such as Modbus, DNP3, IEC 60870-5 
series, ICCP, IEC 61850, and proprietary protocols. In 
different scenarios, the detector can be set to support specific 
protocols. For example, when the IDS is deployed at the 
network between two control centres, the protocol-based 
detector only allows communication traffic complying with 
specific protocols, otherwise it will generate an alert message.  
C.  Behaviour-Based Rules (BBR) 
As a necessary complement to the aforementioned whitelist 
methods, a behaviour-based detection approach finds and 
defines normal and correct behaviours by Deep Packet 
Inspection (DPI). This may include analysis of a single-packet 
or multiple-packet together. SCADA-IDS in different 
scenarios may have different rules in terms of normal 
behaviours. If the IDS is located between a HMI and a 
protocol gateway within a substation, several behaviour-based 
detectors are proposed and defined as follows. 
1) Correlation Detector: For a specific switching device, 
the switching state correlates with relevant measured values. 
For instance, if the switching state changes between open and 
closed, relevant measure values will correctly vary, otherwise, 
alarms will occur, i.e., 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
o
c
If SV open MV Alert
LogIf SV closed M
I e
eV I
=   → 
=
>
< 
 (2) 
where SV represents a switching value; MV(I) means 
measured current values; eo or ec is the positive threshold of 
the electric current value which is near zero. 
2) Relay Protection Function Detector: IED relay 
equipment generally has multiple protection functions (such as 
over-load, over-current, and instantaneous over-current) for 
the purposes of detecting faults and minimizing impacts of 
faults by tripping the associated circuit breakers in power 
systems. When an IED detects a fault and takes some actions 
according to the associated protection algorithm, the alarm or 
trip information will be sent to the HMI in a substation or a 
control centre by remote signalling data. The detector utilises 
correlated information from remote measurement data to 
detect whether the protection information is correct or not. For 
example, in terms of the over-load protection, provided one of 
three-phrase currents exceeds a certain value for a specified 
period of time, the over-load protection action will occur. 
Meanwhile, the alarm or trip information will be uploaded as 
follows.  
•  Over-load alarm: When an over-load alarm signal 
happens, at least one of the associated current measurement 
values should exceed the predefined over-load protection 
setting value. In contrast, when the over-load alarm signal 
disappears, three-phrase current measured values are all below 
the setting value. If any of the two rules is violated, the 
detector will generate actions. i.e., 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1
0
, ,
 
| |
ola a b c ol
ola a b c ol
If MV Alert
LogIf M
RS I I I I
R I IVS I I
=   → 
= 
<
>
 (3) 
where RSola  = 1, 0 means the over-load alarm signal happens 
and disappears, respectively; MV (Ia, Ib, Ic) and MV (Ia | Ib | Ic) 
represent all the three-phrase current measured values and one 
of the three-phrase current measured values, respectively; Iol is 
over-load protection setting value. 
•  Over-load trip: When an over-load trip signal happens, 
all the three-phrase current measured values should be near 
zero. In contrast, when the over-load trip signal disappears, all 
the three-phrase current measured values will be below the 
setting value. If any of the two rules is violated, the detector 
will act. i.e., 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
| |
 
| |
1
0
ol a b c 0
ol a b c ol
If MV Alert
LogIf M
RS I I I e
R I IVS I I
=   → 
= 
>
>
 (4) 
where RSol  = 1, 0 means that the over-load trip signal happens 
and disappears, respectively; MV (Ia | Ib | Ic) means one of the 
three-phrase current measured values; eo represents a positive 
current value which is close zero; Iol is over-load protection 
setting value. 
3) Time-Related Detector: If the control commands are not 
correctly executed due to cyber attacks or misuse, a power 
network may become insecure or potentially unstable. Critical 
control commands have time-related constraints such as time 
interval limit and frequency limit. If the same command is sent 
too frequently, it may violate the following rules. In each case 
the detector will initiate some actions (alert and log).  
 ( ) ( ) ( )1 ,CV n CV n T Actions alert log− − < →  (5) 
where CV is a control command; n is a positive integer (n>1); 
T is the limit of time interval. 
 
( ) ( ) ( )1 ,
1
CV n CV
F Actions alert log
n
−
> →
−
 (6) 
where F represents the frequency limit. 
4) Length Detector: When a SCADA packet contains bytes 
which indicate the length information about the packet in the 
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 5 
payload, it is proposed that a length detector should be applied 
to detect that whether the number shown in the length bytes 
equals to real length of the payload, such that, 
 ( )  l rlPL PL Actions alert,log→≠  (7) 
where PLl is the length value indicated in the length field of 
the payload, and PLrl stands for practical length of the payload. 
5) Range Detector: Normally, measured values belong to 
an operational range with upper and lower boundary values. 
Such measured values may include current (I), voltage (U), 
active power (P), reactive power (Q), and frequency (f). If the 
measured value is outside the expected range, some actions 
will execute automatically, i.e.,
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
,
, , , , , ,...
min max
MV i MV i e i MV i e i
Actions alert log i I U P Q f
 ∉ − + 
→ =
 (8) 
where MV(i) (i = I, U, P, Q,  f,…) represents different measured 
values such as current, voltage, active power, reactive power, 
and frequency, [MV (i)min − e (i), MV (i)max+e (i)] stands for the 
range between the upper and lower boundary and e(i) 
measures the tolerance.  
6) Function Code Detector: In terms of industrial network 
protocols, one of the common features is the use of function 
codes (used in DNP3) or type identification (used in IEC 
60870-5 series). The function code (or type identification) 
detector only allows specifically defined function codes (or 
type identification) according to different SCADA protocols, 
or else security actions will occur. Using the function code 
detector as an example, 
{ } ( ) 1,2,...,|fc iPL FC i n Actions alert,log∉ = →  (9) 
where PLfc is a function code in the payload and FCi 
represents the allowed function codes based on protocols. 
V.  SCADA-IDS IMPLEMENTATION  
In order to implement the SCADA-specific IDS proposed 
in this paper, a SCADA-IDS based on the Internet Traffic and 
Content Analysis (ITACA) tool is developed. ITACA [14] is a 
software platform for traffic sniffing and real-time IP network 
analysis which has been developed by the Centre for Secure 
Information Technologies (CSIT) at the Queen’s University of 
Belfast. The extendable analysis tool enables the 
implementation of plugins to perform specific tasks, e.g., IDS. 
In this paper, the SCADA-specific IDS is developed in C/C++ 
using the ITACA platform, as illustrated in Fig. 4. 
The real-time SCADA-IDS combines ACW, PBW and 
BBR, as presented in Section IV, based on DPI including 
single-packet and multiple-packet inspection. In the 
initialisation stage, the parameters of SCADA-IDS are preset. 
The detailed implementation steps are as follows. 
1) The raw bytes of packet data are captured from the 
SCADA network by a network layer interface, which is 
realised by the Packet Capture (PCAP) library. The ITACA 
core can extract, interpret and analyse the SCADA flows and 
packets up to 4 Gb/sec in order to provide all possible 
information for the realisation of SCADA-IDS plugins. It 
includes the following main modules: the protocol extractor, 
packet storage, flow look up table, event generator, plugin 
queues and event controller. The detailed modules of the 
ITACA core architecture are described in [14]. 
2) To realise the ACW introduced in Section IV-A, the 
trusted source and destination MAC addresses, IP addresses 
and ports in the SCADA network are preset in the 
initialisation stage.  
 
 
Fig. 4.  The process for the implement of proposed SCADA-IDS 
 
3) To implement the PBW discussed in Section IV-B, the 
Perl Compatible Regular Expressions (PCRE) library is 
utilised to identify the SCADA protocol based on application 
layer data using regular expression pattern matching. The 
SCADA protocol type is determined in the initialisation stage 
according to a specific application scenario. The proposed 
SCADA-IDS is capable of supporting widely used SCADA 
protocols such as Modbus, DNP3, IEC 60870-5-103/104, 
ICCP, IEC 61850, and some proprietary protocols.  
4) A database is set up for the SCADA-IDS which stores 
critical status parameters of the SCADA system in order to 
realise multiple packets (cross-packet) inspection, for example, 
to determine the status of circuit breakers and protective relays. 
If the packet data has passed the detection of ACW and PBW, 
the database will be updated when the relevant status changes. 
5) The following detectors belong to BBR as presented in 
Section IV-C. Among them, the time-related detector, 
correlation detector and relay function detector span multiple 
packets which need the support of the database. The other 
detectors are single packet inspection such as the length 
detector, function code detector, and range detector.  
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 6 
6) In the correlation detector described in Section IV-C, the 
threshold values eo or ec are preset. In terms of the relay 
function detector, the over-load protection setting value Iol is 
set according to the specification of IED and the practical 
application. In the time-related detector mentioned in Section 
IV-C, the parameters T and F are set in the initialisation stage. 
The range parameters of the range detector are set in the 
initialisation stage. The function codes of the function code 
detector are also set according to a proprietary SCADA 
protocol.  
If a packet violates any rule implemented above (e.g., 
ACW, PBW, or BBR), the SCADA-IDS will take the 
appropriate action (e.g., alert), record the detection results in 
the log file, and display the results in the Graphical User 
Interface (GUI), as shown in Fig. 4. The GUI is designed and 
developed using Glade and Gtkmm in order to display the 
detection performance and results. 
VI.  SCADA-SPECIFIC CYBER-SECURITY TEST-BED AND 
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
This section presents a SCADA-specific cyber-security 
test-bed focusing on a security enclave within the substation. 
It can be used to investigate cyber-security vulnerabilities and 
implement proposed hybrid intrusion detection approaches in 
a SCADA system. The test-bed is based on a real grid-
connected photovoltaic (PV) SCADA system that has been 
deployed in a practical environment, as illustrated in Fig. 5, 
which uses protocols based on IEC 60870-5 series. 
 
 
 
Fig. 5.  SCADA cyber-security test-bed  
A.  Test-Bed Architecture 
The test-bed architecture contains an HMI, database, 
malicious host (simulated attacker), IDS host, protocol 
gateway (PG), IED simulator (hereafter referred to as IED), 
switch, firewall, router etc, as shown in the dashed box of Fig. 
5. Three Microsoft Windows-based hosts (HMI, PG, IED) 
simulate real-time SCADA communication in a substation 
LAN. The HMI host simulates the master station where 
Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) SCADA supervisory 
control software is installed. The PG host with different COTS 
communication protocol gateway software is used to connect 
IEDs with the HMI. The HMI and PG are connected by a 
switch. The IED communicates with the PG using the IEC 
60870-5-103 protocol. Due to confidentiality concerns the 
names of the SCADA software and the simulated IED in the 
test-bed are withheld.  
The Linux-based malicious host is used to simulate a 
malware infected computer inside the LAN, or a laptop 
connected to the LAN from the outside (e.g., a maintenance 
access), which can be controlled by an attacker. Many cyber 
attacks can be investigated in the test-bed such as DoS, ARP 
spoofing, and Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attacks.  
For testing, the proposed SCADA-specific IDS is deployed 
between the HMI and PG as an interior detection tool. The 
SCADA-IDS is implemented based on the ITACA tool in the 
Linux-based host (see IDS in Fig. 5) which is connected to the 
LAN by port mirroring.  
B.  Man-in-the-Middle Attack  
ARP is primarily used to resolve network layer addresses 
(IP addresses) into data link layer addresses (Ethernet MAC 
addresses) in LAN communication. The ARP spoofing attack 
is used to modify the cached <IP, MAC> pairing in the local 
ARP cache table [15]. Such a MITM attack allows an attacker 
to sniff or tamper information in a LAN by ARP spoofing [16], 
[17]. 
In the test-bed environment presented in this paper, an ARP 
spoofing attack is launched by a Metasploit [18] module in 
Backtrack 5 which is Linux-based penetration testing 
software. This approach is used as it is straightforward to 
perform for testing purposes. Other more complex “MITM” 
attacks may be caused by malware, resulting in similar 
behaviours in the network. ARP is a stateless and trusting 
protocol and does not provide any verification mechanism to 
verify the authenticity of the ARP requests and replies, so 
attacks are possible from malicious hosts in a LAN. In the 
ARP cache poisoning attack launched by Metasploit, the 
attacker (MH) sends ARP replies to the PG host indicating 
that HMI host with the IP **.100.100.98 has the MAC 
**:**:27:ed:09:0f which is the MAC address of the attacker, 
so the PG host will update its ARP cache table with the 
<**.100.100.98, **:**:27:ed:09:0f> paring. In this case, the 
attacker impersonates the HMI so that the PG host will send 
packets destined to the HMI to the attacker instead.  
Similarly, the HMI host can also become the target host of 
a spoofing attack. After local ARP cache in the HMI is 
poisoned, the <IP, MAC> pairing in the ARP cache table will 
be updated from <**.100.100.80, **:**:43:bb:74:4a> to 
<**.100.100.80, **:**:27:ed:09:0f>.  
Furthermore, by poisoning the HMI host and the PG host at 
the same time, the attacker can silently stay in the middle of 
the two hosts (HMI and PG) to launch a MITM attack in the 
test-bed in order to easily sniff all the traffic sent in both 
directions and inject new data into both. The malicious 
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 7 
attacker may utilise the intercepted information to launch 
more severe attacks later.  
In the MITM attack experiment, an attack simulator is 
developed using C/C++ in order to send modified information 
to the HMI host or the PG host. The injected malicious data 
from the attacker will display on the screen of the HMI host 
which may mislead the operator. In a worse-case context a 
false remote operation command such as “open the circuit 
breaker” from the attacker could shed the PV grid and affect 
power supply reliability, and perhaps threaten safety. 
C.  SCADA-IDS Experiment and Results 
For the SCADA-IDS experiment, test network traffic was 
generated which included normal and malicious packets which  
 
may be the goal of a MITM attack. The normal SCADA 
traffic between the HMI and the PG was captured by the 
SCADA-IDS host which is connected to the LAN via port 
mirroring, as shown in Fig. 5. Then, abnormal packets were 
introduced into the test dataset by a MITM attack experiment 
in order to verify proposed whitelist and behaviour based 
attack detection approaches. In this experiment, 500 packets 
are captured including 50 (10%) simulated abnormal packets, 
and wherein the number of abnormal packets violating ACW, 
PBW and BBR is 12 (2.4%), 7 (1.4%) and 31 (6.2%), 
respectively. It can be seen from the experimental results that 
the proposed SCADA-IDS can effectively identify all the 
abnormal data without false positives for the given 
experiment, as shown in Fig. 6. 
 
 
Fig. 6.  The GUI for displaying SCADA-IDS detection results 
 
The SCADA-IDS records all the detection results in a log 
file and displays in the GUI (Fig. 6). The log file is defined 
referring to RFC 3164. The detailed message format is as 
follows:  
<SEVERITY> TIMESTAMP DEVICE_NAME DEVICE_TYPE 
ALERT_TYPE EVENT_DESCRIPTION SRC_IP SRC_PORT 
DST_IP DST_PORT 
In this case, SEVERITY represents alert severity which is 
described by a numerical code, e.g., 0, 1, 2 and 3 stand for 
EMERGENCY, ERROR, WARNING and NOTICE, respectively. The 
TIMESTAMP field is the local time and is in the format of 
“YYYY-MM-DD HH:MM:SS”. DEVICE_NAME means the name 
or IP address of specific security device. DEVICE_TYPE is the 
type of the security device, e.g., IDS. ALERT_TYPE 
represents alert event type which is violated such as ACW, PBW, 
or BBR. EVENT_DESCRIPTION describes the detailed 
information of the specific security event. SRC_IP, 
SRC_PORT, DST_IP and DST_PORT are source IP address, 
source port, destination IP address and destination port, 
respectively. 
The log messages generated as an output from this 
experiment are explained in detail as follows. Fig. 7 shows an 
alert that suspicious Ethernet destination MAC address is 
detected when the packet is sent from PG host (**.100.100.80) 
to HMI host (**.100.100.98). In the alert resulting from an 
ARP spoofing attack, one of ACWs is violated (discussed in 
Section IV-A). 
 
<0> 2012-07-08 20:07:25 SCADA-IDS IDS ACW-2 
Suspicious Ethernet destination MAC address 
(**:**:27:ed:09:0f) **.100.100.80 4512 **.100.100.98 
4512 
 
Fig. 7.  The ACW alert message in the log file 
 
In Fig. 8, the suspicious SCADA protocol is detected by 
PBW, which verifies the proposed protocol based whitelist 
approach as presented in Section IV-B. Any cyber attack 
which violates the SCADA protocol specification will be 
alerted. 
 
<0> 2012-07-08 20:07:25 SCADA-IDS IDS PBW Suspicious 
SCADA protocol **.100.100.80 4512 **.100.100.98 4512 
Fig. 8.  The PBW alert message in the log file 
 
Fig. 9 illustrates part of the alert messages generated due to 
the BBR violation (described in Section IV-C). For example, 
BBR-1, BBR-2, BBR-4, BBR-8, BBR-10-1 and BBR-11 
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 8 
specifically refer to the correlation detector, relay function 
detector, time-related detector, length detector, range detector 
and function code detector, respectively. The results show 
how this behaviour based approach can be effective against 
zero-day attacks, since the physical effects are also detected, 
rather than only the IT causes. 
 
<0> 2012-07-08 20:07:25 SCADA-IDS IDS BBR-1 
Suspicious measured values or remote communication 
**.100.100.80 4512 **.100.100.98 4512 
<0> 2012-07-08 20:07:25 SCADA-IDS IDS BBR-2 
Suspicious measured values or relay protection 
signals **.100.100.80 4512 **.100.100.98 4512 
<0> 2012-07-08 20:07:25 SCADA-IDS IDS BBR-4 
Suspicious remote command **.100.100.98 4512 
**.100.100.80 4512 
<0> 2012-07-08 20:07:25 SCADA-IDS IDS BBR-8 
Suspicious butter overflow **.100.100.80 4512 
**.100.100.98 4512 
<0> 2012-07-08 20:07:25 SCADA-IDS IDS BBR-10-1 
Suspicious measured value **.100.100.80 4512 
**.100.100.98 4512 
<0> 2012-07-08 20:07:25 SCADA-IDS IDS BBR-11 
Suspicious function code **.100.100.80 4512 
**.100.100.98 4512 
Fig. 9.  The BBR alert messages in the log file 
D.  Maximum Execution Time Estimate 
To guarantee reliable operation in SCADA-based control 
systems in power systems, latency is a critical issue for 
communications. Thus, it is necessary to consider the latency 
introduced by any cyber-security process. A statistical 
estimation model using Gumbel distribution in [22] is adopted 
to predict an extreme execution time based on execution time 
samples obtained by experiments. The Gumbel distribution 
belongs to the extreme value distribution family, which has a 
cumulative distribution function representing the likelihood 
that the maximum of a set of sample data of the form {x1, …, 
xn} will be equal to, or less than, x. The Gumbel distribution 
function is as follows: 
( ) ( )
( )
, exp exp ,
x
G x xλ δ
λ
λ
δ
  − − = − >      
  (10) 
where λ and δ are location and scale parameters, which can be 
estimated by maximum likelihood estimation (detailed 
information is in [22]). 
Equation (10) may give the estimated value less than the 
largest piece of sample data. It is necessary for the estimation 
of maximum execution time to only consider values greater 
than the largest value of sample data denoted by maxi. 
Considering this constraint, the Gumbel distribution is as 
follows: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )
, ,
1
imax
ii
i i
i i
x G x P X x X max
P max X x G x G max
P X max G max
λ δ λ δθ = = ≤ > =
< ≤ −
=
> −
   
(11) 
The estimation of the maximum execution time is derived 
from (11). For any estimate ωi the probability that the most 
extreme execution time will occur at, or below, this value will 
be based on the estimation model, as shown in (12).  
( ) ( )( ), 1ii i
max
i i iG λ δ ω η ϕ= − =                         (12) 
where ηi is the likelihood at which an estimate of the 
maximum execution time is exceeded, and ϕi is corresponding 
confidence level. 
In this experiment, the SCADA-IDS execution 
environment uses an Ubuntu 11.04 64-bit operation system 
running on a quad-core Intel i7 processor using a g++ 4.5.2 
compiler. This experiment was repeated 60 times, with a 
maximum execution time max = 59 µs, a sample mean of 46.5 
µs and a standard variance of 24.8. The scale parameter δ and 
the location parameter λ is 19.34 and 35.34, respectively. 
Therefore, the estimation model of the maximum execution 
time for the SCADA-IDS experiment based on (11) and (12) 
is given as: 
( ) ( ) ( )( ), ex2.92 3.92 p exp 0.0517 1.827x xλ δθ ϕ − − += = − + (13) 
From (13), it is possible to evaluate the confidence with 
different estimate values for maximum execution time, as 
shown in Fig. 10.  
From the above statistical analysis, it can be seen that the 
estimated maximum execution time of the SCADA-IDS is  
less than or equal to 151 µs with 99% confidence (Fig. 10) and 
less than or equal to 254 µs with 100% confidence, which 
would not compromise timely availability of data for normal 
operation of SCADA systems. According to IEEE standards 
for electric power substation automation [19], high-speed 
protection information data delivery time requirements are less 
than ¼ cycle (5 ms in 50 Hz systems). Clearly the latency of 
the SCADA-IDS meets the specified time requirement of 
electricity control systems. 
 
Fig. 10.  The diagram of confidence level against maximum execution time 
estimate 
VII.  DISCUSSION  
According to the aforementioned experiments and results, it 
is clear that the proposed multi-attribute SCADA-IDS is an 
effective tool for early warning, detection and prevention of 
intrusion and abnormal behaviours in evolving SCADA which 
will support power system automation.  
The statistical IDS [9] applied to SCADA systems adopts 
statistical approaches such as neural networks and Bayesian 
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 9 
methods to distinguish the abnormal data from the normal 
traffic. However, these methods may lead to false positives 
and false negatives which inevitably will result in false alarms 
and missed attacks. Therefore, although such techniques have 
some merits, when used alone they are not sufficiently 
accurate. This is partly why a multi-attribute approach is 
preferable.  
Setting aside the statistical approach, a comparison will 
now be considered between the proposed IDS and the most 
relevant state-of-the-art proposals. Although it is difficult to 
directly compare different published technologies, which use 
different scenarios and protocols, some indirect and valid 
comparisons can be made, as shown in Table I.  
 
TABLE I  
SCADA-Specific IDS Comparisons 
 
IDS Application scenarios Protocols Implementation methods 
Implementation 
tool Process time Accuracy 
[6] Power plants  Modbus TCP Critical state analysis C# < 1 ms 99% 
[7] Process control systems  Modbus TCP Model-based detection Snort Not published Not published 
[8] IEC 61850 substations ARP/ICMP/HTTP/ FTP/Telnet Blacklist rules Snort Not published 100% 
[23] Some SCADA systems Modbus/DNP3 State-based detection C# Not published    100% 
* 
Proposed 
SCADA-
IDS 
Digital substations 
IEC 60870-5 series/ 
DNP3/proprietary 
protocols 
Whitelist and behaviour 
based approaches 
(ACW+PBW+BBR) 
ITACA 
(C/C++) < 254 µs 100% 
         Note: * The accuracy is 100% under data rates of 180 kb/s. 
 
First, the proposed SCADA-IDS provides a wider 
compatibility in terms of application scenarios and protocols 
handled, e.g., SCADA protocols in digital substations, such as 
IEC 60870-5 series, DNP3, and proprietary protocols. In 
comparison, [6] and [7] only support Modbus TCP in power 
plants and process control systems, respectively. The Snort 
rules in [8] refer to ARP, Internet Control Message Protocol 
(ICMP), Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP), File Transfer 
Protocol (FTP), Telnet, rather than SCADA protocols 
themselves. The proposed IDS also extends the attack scenario 
detection abilities in [8], namely, MITM against SCADA 
protocols. 
Compared with the proposed multi-attribute IDS 
implementation on ITACA, [8] uses blacklist rules in Snort 
parlance, which are not effective against unknown attack. In 
addition, the proposed IDS implementation has better 
flexibility than Snort. This is because it is built using ITACA 
which provides database capabilities to implement user-
defined detection strategies, such as correlation detector, relay 
function detector, and range detector. With Snort it is difficult 
to realise these behaviour-based rules.  
The process time is a critical property for evaluating 
SCADA-IDS performance; however, unfortunately, [7], [8] 
and [23] do not provide evident IDS execution times. 
According to the statistical estimation in Section VI-D, the 
maximum execution time will be less than or equal to 254 µs 
with 100% confidence, which is better than [6]. In terms of the 
IDS accuracy, because deterministic detection approaches are 
presented, rather than statistical or pattern recognition 
algorithms [8], the proposed IDS will consequently detect all 
the malicious packets in any given experiment.  
Compared with the previous IDS methods, the novel 
approach proposed here firstly applies whitelist and behaviour 
based IDS to SCADA systems combining knowledge of 
power systems (domain knowledge) with network security 
techniques. In particular, it is based on fully considering the 
operational features and most common protocols of SCADA 
systems. In addition, the proposed SCADA-IDS can 
effectively identify permitted and non-permitted devices, 
connections, and protocols with enhanced payload inspection 
functionality to detect permitted and non-permitted behaviours 
and operations. Therefore, the multi-attribute SCADA-specific 
IDS can be effective against not only known attacks but also 
unknown attacks. Moreover, it can deal with intrusions from 
outside electricity utilities, as well as inadvertent events from 
inside, in order to make cyber space in SCADA systems more 
secure. Furthermore, as it passively analyses data on the 
network, the susceptibility of the IDS itself to attacks is 
minimal. The proposed SCADA-IDS was implemented as a 
plugin in ITACA, and the flexible design architecture of 
ITACA ensures that the SCADA-IDS plugin provides 
sufficient throughput and low latency such that the practical 
communication requirements [19] of SCADA systems in 
power systems are met, as shown in Section VI-D.  
In order to successfully deploy the proposed SCADA-IDS 
into a live real-world environment, careful consideration will 
need to be given to how the tool can be optimally configured 
during the initialisation stage. Security engineers installing 
tools in this domain must understand specific aspects of the 
SCADA systems to which the IDS will be deployed. 
Knowledge of the communication protocols, field device 
functions, and application environments, is also vital to ensure 
false positive or false negative alarms are minimised. It is 
advisable that initial tests be carried out on “mirrored” systems 
that exactly replicate the performance of the live SCADA 
system, in order to provide a robust verification stage that is 
not possible in the presented test-bed. Ongoing efforts will 
also be required in order to update the capabilities of the IDS 
to detect and mitigate emerging and evolving threats. 
Finally, a significant challenge in this area of research is 
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the lack of an openly available test dataset to compare the 
performance and accuracy of proposed solutions. This is 
understandable from the perspective of SCADA system 
operators, due to the sensitive nature of the data. However for 
research in the community to progress, such a dataset would 
be valuable. 
VIII.  CONCLUSION  
This paper has presented a layered cyber-security 
framework for SCADA systems which combines security 
enclaves, IDS technology and behavioural monitoring to make 
SCADA systems more secure. The framework provides a 
hierarchical approach for an integrated security system, 
comprising distributed IDSs. This approach is compatible with 
currently emerging trends towards using SIEM technology to 
monitor Smart Grids and other critical infrastructure. In this 
context a novel SCADA-IDS with both whitelists and 
behaviour-based SCADA protocol analysis is proposed and 
exemplified in order to detect known and unknown cyber 
attacks from inside or outside of SCADA systems. Finally, the 
proposed SCADA-IDS is implemented and successfully 
validated through a series of realistic scenarios performed in a 
SCADA-specific test-bed developed to replicate cyber attacks 
against a substation LAN.  
Digital substations are critical nodes that are integral to the 
core functions of electricity grids. Consequently, their 
dependable operation is essential to ensure power delivery 
remains secure, stable and reliable. In the context of the rapid 
development and deployment of digital substations around the 
world, timely research on emerging cyber-security issues in 
this area is a highly relevant and urgent issue. However, 
security the digital substation environment is just part of a 
wider and significant effort that is required to ensure the 
secure operation of advanced power systems. Many challenges 
remain to be addressed in other subsystems and for the higher 
level communications architecture where subsystems are 
interconnected.  
Based on published knowledge of cyber vulnerabilities and 
attack scenarios, it is clear that a large number of viable cyber-
security issues exist against Smart Grid SCADA systems, 
which could threaten digital substations. To the best of authors’ 
knowledge, and with reference to the discussion in Section VII, 
it is believe the proposed comprehensive approach and 
implemented SCADA-IDS presents a significant contribution 
to addressing emerging cyber-threats to digital substations, 
and the secure operation of the wider Smart Grid infrastructure. 
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